Appendix A · Notes on Data and Sources

10.1 A note on measurement

The statistical apparatus for documenting the disappearance of small neighbourhood bars in Spain is considerably coarser than the phenomenon it claims to describe. The Instituto Nacional de Estadística, through its Directorio Central de Empresas (DIRCE), publishes an annual count of establecimientos de bebidas (beverage establishments) under code CNAE 5630, a category which aggregates bars, taverns, beer houses, late bars, discobars and cafés into a single undifferentiated total. DIRCE does not disaggregate by number of employees, by ownership structure, or by functional role within the neighbourhood economy. The one-person bar run by its owner — the category on which most of this volume’s argument rests — is statistically indistinguishable in the published series from a thirty-cover hotel bar, a chain franchise, or a themed outlet operating under a pub licence.

A second limitation matters for any comparison across time. Between 1990 and 2010 the total number of hospitality establishments in Spain grew substantially, driven by the expansion of coastal tourism infrastructure and by the legal (and sometimes extra-legal) proliferation of establishments in oversaturated tourist areas. This growth partly masks the parallel loss of neighbourhood bars inland and in the residential districts of historic cities, because both movements occur within the same aggregate category. Any reader consulting DIRCE in search of confirmation of the decline described in this volume should be aware that the evidence must be reconstructed from within a dataset that was not designed to see it.

The figures that follow are therefore presented as orientative rather than exhaustive. They come from INE/DIRCE where the national and autonomous-community totals are robust, from press reconstructions of the same DIRCE data where those reconstructions add breakdown not otherwise available, and from local press reporting for the Granada-specific inventory, which cannot be reconstructed from any public statistical source at present.

10.2 National trend: bars in Spain, 2010–2024

Table 10.1: Beverage establishments in Spain (CNAE 5630), 2010–2024.
Year Beverage establishments (CNAE 5630) Change vs. 2010
2010 202,720
2019 181,230 −10.6%
2022 175,890 −13.2%
2023 168,065 −17.1%
2024 163,890 −19.2%

Source: INE, Directorio Central de Empresas, 1 January of each reference year. 2010, 2019 and 2023 figures as reported by Newtral (García, 2024) from INE DIRCE series; 2024 figure as reported by Libre Mercado and La Iberia (2025) from the same series. The 2022 figure is interpolated from the intermediate DIRCE release and should be treated as approximate.

Over the same period, the count of restaurants and food-serving establishments under CNAE 5610 rose from 71,818 to roughly 83,700, an increase of approximately sixteen per cent. The aggregate hospitality category (CNAE 56) therefore fell only by around five to six per cent between 2010 and 2023, concealing the redistribution within it. What the data describes is not a contraction of hospitality but a reconfiguration: the small beverage establishment has been disappearing and the structured, reservation-based restaurant has been taking its place in the aggregate, though not in the same streets and not at the same prices.

10.3 Regional breakdown: where bars have disappeared fastest

Table 10.2: Regional loss of beverage establishments, 2010–2023, by autonomous community.
Autonomous community Bars lost 2010–2023 (abs.) Change (%)
Comunidad de Madrid −5,946 −26.3%
Castilla y León −3,639 −24.0%
Galicia −3,876 −23.5%
Principado de Asturias −1,432 −22.9%
Castilla-La Mancha −1,904 −20.8%
Canarias −861 −10.2%
Andalucía −3,712 −10.1%
Ceuta −20 −8.4%
Melilla −12 −5.7%
Navarra −9 −0.4%

Source: INE DIRCE, as reconstructed by Newtral (García, 2024). Autonomous communities ordered by relative loss. The remaining communities fall between the extremes shown and are omitted for space.

The low figure for Andalucía in the relative column is consistent with the caveat entered in §A.1. The autonomous community contains both the coastal provinces whose tourism-driven expansion has added beverage establishments over the period and the inland and residential districts whose neighbourhood bars have been closing; the two movements partly cancel in the aggregate. A province-level breakdown would be required to see the pattern more clearly, and is not currently available in published form.

10.4 Granada: a documented inventory of closures

Because DIRCE does not publish a province-level series disaggregated by local function, the Granada-specific evidence in this volume draws on local press reporting. The inventory below is necessarily partial: it records establishments whose closure or demolition was considered sufficiently notable to be covered in Ideal, Granada Hoy, Granada Digital, Cadena SER Radio Granada, or the regional edition of El País, between 2017 and 2024. Establishments that closed quietly — which is to say, most of them — do not appear.

Table 10.3: Documented closures of long-standing establishments in Granada, 2017–2024.
Year Establishment Location Notes
2017 Farmacia Zambrano C. Reyes Católicos, 24 Since 1876; included for context
2019 Bar La Sabanilla C. San Sebastián Since 1883; demolished after ruin order
pre-2020 Bodegas Espadafor Gran Vía Emblematic; closed prior to pandemic
2020 Café Lisboa Plaza Nueva Closed during first-wave lockdowns
2020 Bar Luis XV Avda. de Madrid Proprietor retired; viability lost
2020 Cortijo Charavinillo Vega de Granada Rural-edge restaurant; closed 2020
2020 El Chanquete Pedro Antonio de Alarcón Seafood specialist; transferred
2020 Kudamm I Pedro Antonio de Alarcón Hispano-German; small premises unviable
2020 La Blanca Paloma Various Closed during first-wave lockdowns
2020 La Bella y la Bestia Central (4 premises) Four-premises operation collapsed
2023 El Ventorrillo Junto Palacio de Congresos 100 years; demolished for 5-storey block
2023 Bar Alhambra C. Cristo de la Yedra 60 years; owner retiring; attached note

Attached note on Bar Alhambra. The proprietor, interviewed by Granada Hoy shortly before closure, attributed the neighbourhood’s decline in part to the departure of the Facultad de Medicina and the relocation of services away from the old Clínico. The observation is consistent with the argument advanced in the Introduction regarding the Barrio de los Doctores: the perimeter of affordable sociability that formed around the three large hospitals depended on a continuous flow of staff, students and visiting families, and was vulnerable to any reconfiguration of the institutions it served. When the medical faculty and the central hospital functions were moved, the economic basis for the bars that had served them was removed at the same time, though not at the same pace.

10.5 Province-wide impact during the pandemic

The Federación Provincial de Hostelería y Turismo de Granada estimated, at the close of the first pandemic year, that 1,500 hospitality businesses had ceased operation in the province of Granada, with an associated loss of between 8,000 and 10,000 jobs (Granada Digital, 2022). The federation’s president, Gregorio García, had earlier projected a minimum closure rate of fifteen per cent among associated businesses, which he considered potentially optimistic. National estimates by the consultancy UVE Solutions placed the pandemic-period loss of HORECA outlets in Spain at around fourteen per cent. These figures are not directly comparable to the DIRCE series in §A.2, which records only net annual change in registered establishments and smooths across the year.

10.6 A note on replacement

The most consistent finding across the reporting consulted is that the locales vacated by closing neighbourhood bars have not, in general, been replaced by establishments of the same type. Where replacement has occurred, it has tended towards two models: conversion of the premises to residential use, particularly in central districts under housing pressure; and occupation by establishments operating under chain or group structures, whether local (Casa Ysla, Puerta Bernina, La Cueva de 1900, Los Manueles, Los Diamantes, La Esquinita, Bar Aliatar) or national. Several of these groups expanded during the pandemic period, in part to absorb staff from their own closed premises and in part to take advantage of favourable terms on vacated locales. The UVE Solutions report for 2024 records that organised hospitality grew by 9.9% in the year while independent hospitality grew by only 1.6%, a divergence consistent with the pattern observed in Granada.

This is not, in itself, a judgement about the quality of the establishments involved. It is an observation about structure. The question of whether a city in which most bars are outlets of a group operates, for its residents, as the same kind of place as a city in which most bars are independent single-proprietor businesses is a question the volume addresses in the chapters that follow.

10.7 Sources

Primary aggregated data: INE, Directorio Central de Empresas (DIRCE), annual series for CNAE 5610 and 5630, 2008–2024.

Press reconstructions and commentary: García, Y. (2024), “¿Por qué cada vez hay menos bares en España? Desde 2010 han desaparecido el 17%”, Newtral, 1 January; “Sangría en la hostelería: España pierde 40.000 bares”, Libre Mercado, October 2025; “España dejará de ser un país de bares”, La Iberia, November 2025.

Granada-specific reporting: Barrera, J. F. (2020), “Los bares de Granada que han cerrado…”, Ideal, 6 September; Romero, A. R., “Se pierde un bar de barrio…”, Granada Hoy; López Rivera, M. (2022), “La hostelería de Granada se apunta al modelo de las cadenas”, Granada Digital; Álvarez, C. (2023), “Negocios míticos a los que Granada ha dicho adiós”, Ideal, 21 March; Troyano, R. (2020), “La agonía de este propietario de bar en Granada: ‘Cierro hoy’”, Cadena SER Radio Granada, 9 November.

Consultancy reporting: UVE Solutions (2024), UVE Data Market Horeca 2024, Madrid.


10.8 Rental Prices

Line chart showing average rental price rise from approximately €6.2/m² in 2015 to €11.8/m² in 2024 in Granada's central districts.
Figure 10.1: Average rental price per m², Granada historic districts, 2015–2024. Source: Idealista (2024); INE, Encuesta Continua de Hogares. Prices deflated to 2015 euros using CPI (INE, 2024).

Methodological note. Central districts defined as Realejo, Centro, Albaicín, and Beiro (INE census section codes […]). Prices deflated using the Spanish CPI general index (INE, base year 2015). Figures for 2022–2024 are provisional pending INE confirmation. See Cócola-Gant (2018) for the analytic framework applied to comparable cases.


10.9 Tourist Accommodation Licences

Bar chart showing the approximate number of tourist accommodation licences (VUT) and beds per municipal district in Granada in 2023.
Figure 10.2: Approximate distribution of active tourist accommodation licences (VUT, whole dwelling) and beds by district, Granada, 2026. Source: Author’s elaboration based on Junta de Andalucía, Registro de Turismo de Andalucía (RTA).

Methodological note. Figures are based on the total number of viviendas de uso turístico (whole dwellings, not rooms) registered in the Registro de Turismo de Andalucía (RTA) for the municipality of Granada in 2026, which amount to 3,462 dwellings and more than 17,500 beds. The intra-urban distribution by district shown here is an approximate reconstruction, intended to reflect the strong concentration in Centro-Sagrario, Albaicín and Realejo-Fígares reported by municipal and regional sources, rather than an exact administrative breakdown.


10.10 Commerce Evolution

Line chart showing decline in proximity commerce from index 100 in 2010 to approximately 66 in 2023.
Figure 10.3: Proximity commerce establishments, Granada historic centre, 2010–2023 (indexed, 2010 = 100). Source: INE, Directorio Central de Empresas (DIRCE); CNAE-2009 codes 47.2–47.7.

Methodological note. Proximity commerce defined as CNAE-2009 codes 47.2 (food and drink), 47.3 (fuel), 47.4 (ICT), 47.5 (household goods), 47.6 (cultural and recreational), and 47.7 (other specialist retail). Historic centre boundary follows the Conjunto Histórico-Artístico declaration perimeter. Establishments include both self-employed (autónomos) and company registrations.


10.11 Tourist-to-Resident Ratio

Table 10.4: Tourist overnight stays vs. resident population, Granada, selected years. Source: INE, Encuesta de Ocupación Hotelera (EOH); Padrón Municipal.
Year Residents Overnights Ratio
2,015 234,800 1,820,000 7.8
2,018 232,700 2,140,000 9.2
2,019 231,100 2,380,000 10.3
2,021 228,600 1,650,000 7.2
2,022 227,400 2,210,000 9.7
2,023 226,900 2,490,000 11.0

Note. Ratio = overnight stays ÷ resident population. A ratio above 8–10 is associated in the comparative literature with measurable degradation of services for permanent residents (Fremdling et al., 2023). Figures for 2021 reflect COVID-19 restrictions. [PLACEHOLDER — verify all figures with INE sources]


10.12 Data Sources Summary

Table 10.5: Data sources for Vol. I indicators. Items marked [DATA NEEDED] require verification before final render.
Indicator Source Year URL / Access
Rental prices Idealista; INE 2015–2024 idealista.com/informes
Tourist licences Junta de Andalucía RTAND 2023 juntadeandalucia.es/turismo
Commerce evolution INE DIRCE, CNAE 47.2–47.7 2010–2023 ine.es/dirce
Student enrolment / housing UGR Memoria Académica; INE 2024 ugr.es/memoria
Noise / acoustic data Ayto. Granada; EEA [TBC] [DATA NEEDED]
Tourist-to-resident ratio INE EOH; Padrón 2015–2023 ine.es/eoh

10.13 Sanctions: the Andalusian comparator

The single institutional comparison of municipal traffic sanctions across Andalusian capitals on record was conducted by the Defensor del Pueblo Andaluz (Defensor del Pueblo Andaluz, 2014) as part of an ex officio enquiry. The figures it produced, here normalised by contemporaneous population, are reproduced in Table 10.6. The dictamen itself observed that the discrepancy could not be explained by population, vehicle fleet, or any other ordinary variable, and concluded that the difference “must lead the local authorities of that Council to reflect on what is happening”. Twelve years on, the reflection has not been published.

Table 10.6: Expedientes sancionadores de tráfico iniciados por los ayuntamientos de Granada, Málaga, Córdoba y Cádiz en 2008 y 2012, normalizados por población. Fuente: Defensor del Pueblo Andaluz (2014); población a 1 de enero de cada año, INE Padrón continuo.
Municipio Población 2008 Expedientes 2008 Por 1.000 hab. 2008 Población 2012 Expedientes 2012 Por 1.000 hab. 2012
Granada 236.207 258.933 1.096 239.017 215.383 901
Málaga 566.447 181.646 321 568.479 137.173 241
Córdoba 325.453 68.713 211 328.704 74.572 227
Cádiz 126.766 31.743 250 123.948 33.443 270

The pattern is, in the technical sense of the word, anomalous. At the high point of the period audited, the city of Granada was opening more than one traffic sanction per inhabitant per year — a rate roughly four times that of Córdoba, a comparable inland provincial capital, and roughly four times that of Málaga, which had more than twice Granada’s population and considerably more vehicles. Even at the lower end of the period, with sanctions falling from 258,933 to 215,383, Granada’s per-capita rate remained between three and four times those of its peers. The Ombudsman’s dictamen explicitly ruled out the most obvious candidate explanation — that granadinos drive worse than malagueños or cordobeses — on the grounds that no plausible behavioural difference of that magnitude exists or has ever been documented.

The comparison set has acknowledged limits and they should be named. Málaga is more than twice Granada’s size; Cádiz is half of it; Córdoba is the closest peer in both population and provincial-capital function. Even after these caveats, Granada’s per-capita sanction rate stands outside any plausible normal range for a Spanish provincial capital of its category. National-scale press analyses since the dictamen — most notably the studies periodically published by the Fundación Línea Directa — have continued to identify Granada among the five most prolific sanctioning municipalities in Spain, in the company of Madrid, Barcelona, Palma de Mallorca and Bilbao (Fundación Línea Directa, 2016); the company is not flattering and the explanation is not forthcoming.

10.14 A note on what this table cannot show

The reader who has reached this point is entitled to ask why the table covers only Andalusian capitals and does not extend to the provincial capitals of comparable size elsewhere in Spain — Vitoria, Valladolid, Oviedo, Pamplona, A Coruña — which the chapter’s argument might seem naturally to invite. The honest answer is that no comparable institutional audit exists for those cities, and that the apparently equivalent figures one can assemble from press releases, municipal budgets and DGT spreadsheets are not in fact equivalent: each municipality counts, classifies and reports differently; the boundary between “sanción de tráfico” and “sanción de movilidad” varies; the treatment of expedientes that begin and are subsequently voided differs; and the published totals are not always disaggregated from those of provincial-level traffic police. A table built on those figures would have the appearance of rigour without the substance, which is the worst combination in this kind of work.

What the comparison set above does support is a single, defensible claim: within the institutional context for which a proper audit exists — the eight Andalusian capitals — Granada has been, demonstrably and over a sustained period, an outlier of a kind that the responsible authority itself was unable to explain. The chapter rests on that claim and not on a more ambitious one.

For the urban-mortality dimension, the chapter relies on the provincial-level figures published annually by the Comisión Provincial de Tráfico (Redacción ahoraGranada, 2026); these are not directly comparable to municipal-level figures from other capitals, and no attempt is made here to force them into a comparison they cannot sustain. The DGT’s own consolidated urban balance for 2024 — 488 fatalities and 5,043 hospitalised casualties in Spanish urban roads, of which 79 per cent were vulnerable users (Dirección General de Tráfico, 2025) — is the figure against which local trends should be read, but the desegregation by municipality is not published in a form that would allow a clean intercity table.